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ABSTRACT
MARGARET WHITAKER HUTTER: The Pendulum’s Dance with Dictatorship and
Democracy: A Look at Journalistic Successes, Failures and Trends of the TwentiethCentury Spanish Press
(Under the direction of Melvin Arrington)

The Spanish press has been compared by some to a pendulum, oscillating back
and forth between a free press and a press subject to complete censorship by the Spanish
government. This thesis is a study ofthe twentieth-century Spanish press between the
years 1939 and 1989. In it I examine the swinging of the pendulum of the Spanish press
between the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, the transition to democracy, and
throughout the first decade of the established democratic Spanish state. I take a critical
look at the journalistic successes, failures and trends ofthe Spanish press throughout this
50-year scope as well as the significant relationship between a free press and a successful
democracy. These twentieth-century trends are contextualized within political, economic
and social frames as well as within the extensive history of the Spanish periodic press. In
order to provide concrete examples of my findings, I have analyzed specific articles from
the Spanish periodical ABC—examples which illustrate the trends, successes and
limitations of the twentieth-century Spanish press.

IV

PREFACE

This study has been inspired by and written considering two different
perspectives. The first perspective comes from my fascination with the history ofthe
Spanish state. This thesis examines profound social, economic and political changes in
Spain during the nation’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, using the press as a
way to streamline that study. The second perspective comes from my view as a
journalism student. In this study, I define two ofthe fundamental elements ofjournalism
and examine the successes and failures of the Spanish press in the context ofthese
elements. This thesis uses the history of the Spanish press to examine certain journalistic
trends and implications, and it also uses certain journalistic elements to study and analyze
a period of great change and importance in the history ofthe Spanish state.
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INTRODUCTION

Journalism is the act of reporting news, and news, at its core, is simply necessary
information. Facts regarding the economy, statements made by public figures, sports
scores, everyday personal opinions and details regarding the weather each classify as
information people need to make informed decisions throughout their day-to-day lives.
Throughout history, the basic need for news has been ever-present—a trend that has
persisted over centuries and across the globe. In the days of hunter-gatherers, news came
in the form of oral messages, reporting whether or not food was over the next hill
(Kovach and Rosenstiel 1, 2). In the Age of Enlightenment, papers reported news of
inventions, discoveries and new theories. Now,in the twenty-first century, news
surrounds us. Internet, television and traditional print publications all provide a steady
flow of information, constantly connecting different comers of the world through the
simple commonality of an instinctual need for news. Through different mediums, in
different countries and at different speeds, information has always been spread to the
general public.
In addition to this basic human need for news, another journalistic trend has
emerged over time—the concept that an organic and mutually beneficial relationship
exists between a free press and democracy. At the heart of democracy lies the
fundamental belief that people can govern themselves—the belief that, with enough
information, citizens can make informed decisions regarding their nation and their
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individual lives. In order to make the decisions and choices necessary to successfully
govern itself, the public must be informed. The key to democracy is public awareness and
producing public awareness is a journalist's job. Thomas Jefferson once said regarding
the press-

If I had to choose between government without newspapers, and newspapers

without government, I wouldn't hesitate to choose the latter"—reflecting the belief that
while journalism can exist without democracy, democracy would be fatally ruined
without a free press (Cardin).
Countries across the world have distinct histories with both a national periodical
press and democracy. Some nations have experienced democracy, while others have not;
some have had a free press, while other nations have not. Spain, a country dating back to
the fifteenth century, has a significant history with both. While the periodical press and
democracy are both significant pieces in the patchwork ofthe nation’s past, Spain’s
journalistic history goes back far beyond that of its relationship with democracy. The
history of the Spanish periodical press dates back to the 1400s, while the first successful
Spanish democracy was not established until the second half ofthe twentieth century.
On November 20,1975, General Francisco Franco died, bringing the caudillo’s
38-year-long dictatorship over the Spanish state to an end. Over the following year. King
Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Adolfo Saurez worked to successfully transform Spain
from dictatorship to democracy—achieving that goal with the ratification of the 1976
Political Reform Act, which called for a democratically elected parliament(Ross 1-7).
Between November 20, 1975 and December 15, 1976—just 390 days—Spain was
transformed, by law, from a dictatorship to a democracy.(Ross 1-7).
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Spain's journalistic history is unique. The history of the Spanish press has been
compared by some to the swinging of a pendulum—left to right, right to left. On the left
of the trajectory lies freedom of the press, on the right, complete censorship (Schulte 2).
With such extremes on either side, in the center of the pendulum's trajectory lies a
moderately free press—an elusive blend offreedom and control. From the fifteenth
century to the twenty-first, ever-changing sociopolitical influences have caused the
pendulum to oscillate, swinging back and forth between the two extremes. In order to
examine trends of the twentieth-century Spanish press, it is important to contextualize the
study within the extensive history of Spanish journalism, a history that will be explored
in Chapter One.
This study will take a detailed look at the state and quality of the twentiethcentury Spanish periodical press in terms oftwo fundamental elements ofjournalism.
The criteria by which I will judge the journalistic quality are as follows:

1. Is the press’ first obligation to the truth? And,
2. Does the press provide the public with information necessary for citizens to live
their day-to-day lives?

Across different cultures and throughout different times, these two elements have
surfaced as bulwarks of the periodical press—bulwarks that represent the spirit and the
original intention ofjournalism at its core(Kovach and Rosenstiel 1, 2). This study will
examine the oscillating pendulum of the Spanish press over a 50 year range, from 1939 to
1989. Within this half-century scope, it will focus on the state of the Spanish press
throughout three distinct periods. The first period dates from 1939 to 1959—the first
twenty years of Francisco Franco's authoritarian rule; the second period covers the years
3

1960 through 1976, the last sixteen years of Franco’s dictatorship and a period that saw
the first social, economic and legal transitions from dictatorship to democracy; and the
third period stretches from 1977 to 1989, covering the first decade of the new democratic
state and completing the half-century scope oftime. The study will analyze the successes,
the failures and the trends of the periodical press throughout these years and will show
the organic relationship that was formed between the press and the democratic Spanish
state.
In order to pinpoint specific examples of the successes, failures and the evolution
of the Spanish press, individual articles of the Spanish periodical ABC have been
analyzed—each case study reflecting certain aspects of the twentieth-century Spanish
press in relation to the two previously defined fundamental elements ofjournalism. A
historically conservative paper, ABC was established in Madrid on January 1, 1903 by
Torcuata Luca de Tena. Still published today, it is currently the third most widely read
newspaper in Spain. With a long and distinctive past, the lifespan and archives ofABC
stretch throughout the scope ofthis study and the content ofthe publication reflects
trends within the whole of the nation’s periodical press.
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CHAPTER 1: History and trends of the Spanish press

In order to examine the successes, failures and trends ofthe Spanish press from
1939 to 1989, this timeframe must first be situated within the extensive history ofthe
Spanish periodical press. As a nation, Spain’s history stretches back over five-hundred
years to when it was unified in the second half of the fifteenth century. Throughout these
centuries, there have been five pivotally important times in the history of Spanish
journalism, each representing a movement ofthe pendulum that symbolizes the periodical
press (Schulte 12).
The first of these moments was the arrival ofthe moveable-type printing press in
1470. German inventor Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press in 1440, and
within three decades it had reached Spain, dramatically changing the nature of both
printing and the press within Spanish society. Prior to Gutenberg’s invention, printed
documents were made by using non-reusable wooden blocks—making the process timeconsuming, inefficient and expensive. Gutenberg’s invention both simplified and
shortened the printing process. Also, because the press was reusable, printing was made
much more affordable for the average citizen. Gutenberg’s invention spread throughout
Europe within decades. By 1500, over 2,500 printing presses had reached Western
Europe, and by 1470 they had reached Spain (Kreis).
Almost immediately following the invention of the printing press, there was a
major increase in the circulation of printed documents and newspapers, allowing for
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information to be to spread more quickly and accurately throughout all of Western
Europe. An important consequence of Gutenberg’s printing press was a shift ofthe
control over printing and printed materials. Prior to Gutenberg’s invention, almost all
books and documents in Spain were printed by the Catholic Church. The Church,
therefore, had almost complete control over what information was spread to the public.
However, as the printing press became more affordable and more available to secular
groups in society, the Church lost this complete control (Butler). The emergence of the
moveable-type printing press in Spanish society marks the true start ofthe Spanish press
and the introduction of the metaphorical pendulum. As the Church gradually lost
exclusive control over the distribution of information, the natural birth of a free press
occurred. This loss of control and infant free press marks the first movement of the
pendulum—its neutrality offset for the first time, falling towards the left of its trajectory.
The second pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press came just 32 years
after the arrival of the printing press. In 1502, Spain’s monarchical rulers Ferdinand and
Isabella introduced a regulation that called for the censorship of all publications produced
within Spain or entering the country from abroad (Spain: From Ferdinand and Isabella to
Phillip). For the first time, the youthful press was restricted, a restriction that marks the
swing of the pendulum to the right of its trajectory.
The regulation was established within the first three decades ofthe Spanish
Inquisition, which began in 1480 and lasted until 1834. The Spanish Inquisition is said to
have caused the deaths of between 3,000 and 5,000 people throughout its 350 year
history. One of the monarchy’s main motives behind the Inquisition was to achieve
religious and political unification of the autonomously divided country (Chalmers). Prior
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to its establishment as a Christian state in 1492, the country was composed of
independent kingdoms, each with distinct histories, traditions and leadership. Despite the
nation’s legal unification in 1492, these cultural divisions persisted long aftewards.
Adding fire to the cultural divisions within the new Spanish state, religious division
throughout the area remained strong as well. Following the Moorish Invasion of 711,
Islam dominated the Iberian Peninsula for nearly 800 years. After a long period of
decline, however, Muslim domination officially ended in 1492, with the conclusion of the
Christian Reconquest, or Reconquista. Prior to the reconquest, three religions coexisted to
a certain extent in the Iberian Peninsula—Christianity, Islam and Judaism (Islam: Muslim
Spain). After 1492, however, only one was dominant: Christianity—more specifically.
Catholicism.
Paired with the long-established cultural and political differences dividing the
nation, the country’s history of religious diversity was a major factor in Ferdinand and
Isabella’s establishment of the Inquisition. During the Inquisition, court hearings were
held that dealt with religious heresy, and thousands of Muslims and Jews were sentenced
to death. Catholicism emerged even stronger as the dominant religion ofthe Spanish
state. During the Inquisition, the monarchy flexed its control over the public religiously,
politically, and in terms offreedom of expression—an example of which was the 1502
regulation calling for the censorship of all printed documents. This regulation, the second
pivotal moment in the history ofthe Spanish press, led to the pendulum’s first movement
towards the right of its trajectory, a rightward lean that would remain for almost three
centuries, not shifting again until the nineteenth century.
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The third pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press was the promulgation
of the Spanish Constitution of 1812, which took place on March 19,1812(Schulte 12).
Along with rights to both individual freedoms and education, the constitution called for
freedom of the press as well—swinging the pendulum strongly towards the left. These
constitutional rights were enjoyed almost immediately by the journalistic profession and
the Spanish people as a whole, and the constitution proved to be one ofthe most liberal
legal measures in Spanish history (H.B.). These liberties, however, were short lived.
The constitution was established in the midst of the Spanish War of
Independence—a subset of the Peninsular War, which took place from 1808 until 1814
on the Iberian Peninsula. The Peninsular War was part ofthe greater Napoleonic Wars
a series of conflicts throughout Western Europe from 1805 until 1815. The Spanish War
of Independence was fought between Spain and France and resulted from a series of
rebellions in Madrid, where the people rioted against the installation of Joseph Bonaparte,
the brother of French-ruler Napoleon Bonaparte, as king of Spain (Thomas). Although
Spain faced initial defeats in its War of Independence, with help from England, Spanish
forces were able to cause the French to retreat in 1813, and in 1814, Spaniard Ferdinand
VII was established as king.
Soon after being named King of Spain, Ferdinand VII abolished the liberal and
much-loved Constitution of 1812. Ironically, Spain’s success in the Spanish War of
Independence led directly to the abolition of the freedoms that the constitution had
defined just two years earlier. The constitution was reinstated twice, first from 1820 to
1823 and again from 1836 to 1837(Thomas). Following the third abolition of the liberal
constitution, the Spanish press fell into a sort of limbo, having truly experienced a free
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press under the Constitution of 1812 but having also experienced government-imposed
restrictions when those liberties were taken away. Thus, after having swung towards the
left with the liberties provided by the Constitution of 1812, the pendulum settled into the
vague area found in the center of its trajectory.
The fourth pivotal moment in the history of the Spanish press marks the
beginning of the period this study will examine (see Chapter Two). In 1938, General
Francisco Franco enacted the 1938 Press Law,or la Ley de Prensa de 1938, calling for
complete censorship of the Spanish press (Schulte 12). After having hung in the center
for over a century, with the enactment of this legislation, the pendulum of the Spanish
press swung rapidly to the right, where it remained for decades to come, stunting the
expression, growth and success of the Spanish periodical press.
The fifth and most recent pivotal moment occurred 28 years later, with the
enactment of the Press Law of 1966—la Ley de Prensa e Imprenta de 1966. This
regulation, established a decade before the end of Franco’s dictatorship, caused a slight
but significant movement of the pendulum towards the left. The law was passed during
the nation’s transition from dictatorship to democracy, a transition that had begun
decades prior to Franco’s death and became legally official in 1976(See Chapter Three).
As displayed by these five moments,the history ofthe Spanish press has been
long and unbalanced. Stretching over five centuries and oscillating between two
extremes, these pivotal moments display the swinging ofthe pendulum and provide
historical context for the twentieth-century press that will be discussed in the following
chapters. The 1938 Press Law and the Press and Print Law of 1966 are both examined in
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detail within this study, and the successes and failures ofthe twentieth-century Spanish
press are directly related to both pieces of legislation.
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CHAPTER II: The Spanish Press under the Franco Regime(1939—1959)

Political and Social Background
On July 18, 1936, the three-year-long Spanish Civil War, or Guerra Civil, began.
A military uprising against an elected official on July 18 sparked the bloody war fought
between the two major political groups in Spanish society—the Nationalists, los
nacionalistas, and the Popular Front, or elfrente popular. By the end of the war in 1939,
General Francisco Franco had risen to power both within Nationalist forces and as leader
of the Spanish state. The end of the war marked the start of General Franco’s 38-yearlong dictatorship.
There were many factors that led to the outbreak of civil war. Politically, Spain
had been unstable for over a century. Throughout the first three-quarters of the 1800s,
numerous military coup d’etats caused sudden changes in leadership, preventing the
nation from having a steady leader or group in control. Political power shifted from the
left to the right then from the right to the left. In 1873, the First Republic of Spain was
established; however, after Just one year, the republic fell to a successful military coup
and the monarchy was subsequently restored. Decades later in 1923, King Alfonso XIII
approved a military coup initiated by General Miguel Primo de Rivera, ending the
monarchy’s rule. Following the successful coup, Rivera established a mild dictatorship
that lasted from 1923 until 1930, when he and King Alfonso XIII fled from Spain due to
lack of support.
11

With these constant coups back and forth, Spain had grown politically divided
between the left and the right. The left consisted of landless peasants, laborers and urban
intellectuals, all influenced by different political leanings, including but not limited to
Marxism, liberalism and anarchism. The right was composed of pro-tradition and pro
authority enthusiasts, including the Catholic Church,the monarchy, the military, wealthy
landowners, and many urban, middle-class workers(Ross 2, 3). Through decades and
decades of uncertain and quick-changing political times, one constant certainty
prevailed—the stark divide between these two groups.
After King Alfonso XIII and General Primo de Rivera fled the country in 1930,
the leftward-led Spanish Second Republic was established, lasting from 1931 to 1936.
Although the Second Republic provided for a democratic state, it was founded more for
the lack of other plausible alternatives than for a consolidated desire or push for
democracy. Throughout the years of the Second Republic, tensions between the two
groups of Spanish society had risen to an all-time high. With a staunchly divided
populace, a loosely tied group of leftist supporters, and a rather impassionate start, the
Second Republic had little chance of success. On July 18 and 19, 1936, a military
uprising from the right brought the Second Republic to an end. Tensions were pushed to a
breaking point and the Spanish Civil War officially began.
While political turbulence was the chief factor behind the outbreak of civil war,
other factors played major parts in the war’s start as well. Throughout the western world,
the nineteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century had been a time
of major technological and intellectual innovation. The Enlightenment ofthe eighteenth
century had led to the distinction of Western Europe as a separate entity from Eastern
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Europe, reflecting its distinguished push towards modernity(Sluga 183,184). The
Western Enlightenment spurred the technological advancements making industrialization
possible. Increased industrialization, liberalism and nationalism had modernized many
Western nations by the start of the twentieth century.
The Enlightenment, the effects ofthe Enlightenment, and the swift surge towards
modernity, however, stopped short at the Spanish borders. Technologically and
industrially, Spain fell far behind France, England, Germany, the United States and other
swiftly modernizing nations. The nation’s tense and long-divided political atmosphere
had kept the sweeping phenomenon of nationalism and liberalism from passing over the
country’s borders, and Spain’s failure to modernize at the rate of other Western nations
had isolated it from international affairs and the international market. Isolation, lack of
industrialism and a divided political atmosphere drastically hurt the nation’s economy,
and all of these forces came to a head in the 1930s. During the five years of the Second
Republic, Spain entered a period of economic depression. Industrial output dropped onethird from just a decade before and the nation’s economic development was practically at
a standstill (Payne 48).
Lack of modernization and the economic depression led to another problem for
the nation as well. As opposed to almost all other Western nations, by the 1930s, Spain
was still lacking a strong, unified middle, or bourgeois, class(Ross 2). With industrial,
economic, political and social problems plaguing the nation, the Spanish Civil War
erupted after more than a century of multifaceted frustrations. Having lacked strong
leadership for so long, Spain, it seemed, was ready for a leader, and during the Civil War,
General Francisco Franco emerged to fill that void.
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By the time the war began in 1936, Franco, then 44, had been active in the
Spanish military for over 25 years. As a teen. Franco enrolled in the Army’s Infantry
Academy at Toledo, and by the age of 18 he had been commissioned as a second
lieutenant. Franco quickly made a name for himself within the Spanish army, both for his
introverted, serious demeanor as well as his quick upward mobility within the ranks. In
just 16 years. Franco moved from lieutenant to captain to major comandantin (little
major)to lieutenant colonel to colonel to general and finally to major general(Payne 210).
Although Franco was not involved with the military coup that had started the war,
he was soon unanimously elected to be the head ofthe nationalist forces. At the start of
the war. Franco’s army was greatly outnumbered by leftist forces. However, with the
support of the Spanish military and the training, skills and leadership of Francisco
Franco, the nationalists soon grew in both size and success. Throughout the war.
nationalist forces received military and economic support from Italy and Germany,
diplomatically linking Franco with fascist leaders for the first time. With the support from
Mussolini and Hitler, the nationalists made great strides, and by mid-1937 the republican
forces had dwindled significantly.
Despite their success on the military front, in 1937 the nationalists still lacked a
plan for governmental organization. While Franco had been successful as a military
leader, he had little political experience and was rather uncreative when it came to
organizing the development ofthe future nationalist-led government. After months of
procrastination. Franco decided to adopt the political ideals of the Falange—a political
party that had been modeled after Mussolini’s fascist government in Italy. The adopted
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Falange platform was in favor of imperialism, nationalism, dictatorship, violence and
syndicalism, and was strongly against liberalism and capitalism. The government would
also be pro-military and ultra-Catholic, and Franco said that he would base his totalitarian
rule after the monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella (Payne 19-24).
The Spanish Civil War came to an end on April 1, 1939 when the last remaining
Republican forces surrendered unconditionally in Madrid. As commander-in-chief ofthe
winning side. Franco had risen to the position of both military and political leader of
Spain. With no other government structure having been suggested. Franco held on to the
authoritative power he had ruled with over his own forces- -now having absolute control
over the nation as a whole. The dictatorship of Francisco Franco had begun, and would
last until his death in 1975.

The Press Law of April 22, 1938
Although Franco was not officially recognized as the leader of Spain until 1939,
by the time the war had ended. Franco and his top nationalist supporters had already
established a Council of Ministers, or Cabinet, to draw up new legislation. One of the
very first regulations enacted by the Cabinet was the Press Law of 1938—^the fourth
pivotal moment in the history ofthe Spanish press (Schulte 12). Just as Ferdinand and
Isabella had put strict limitations on the press in 1502, Franco, as promised, followed suit
in imitating the monarchs’ totalitarian rule and enacted a similarly restrictive press law in
1938. With the establishment ofthis law, the pendulum of the Spanish press, which had
been resting in the center of its trajectory for decades, swung swiftly towards the right.
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On April 22, 1938, Franco signed the new law into effect. With a detailed
preamble and many subset articles, the legislation formally denounced the freedom ofthe
Spanish press—putting specific limitations and restrictions on all periodicals. The
preamble of the law condemned “freedom in the democratic style” and Article One gave
the Ministry of the Interior ofthe Spanish State “the organization, supervision and control
of the national institution of the periodic press”(Tusell 17)(Ley de Prensa de 22 de abril
de 1938, Articulo 1). The government’s power over the press was multifaceted and allinclusive.
The government was given the right of:

1. Regulating the number and size of periodical publications,
2. Participating in the designation of directive personnel,
3. Ordering the journalistic profession,
4. Supervising press activity, and
5. Censoring all publications”(Schulte 13).

Regulating the number and size ofperiodical publications

Prior to the Press Law of 1938, the size and scope ofthe Spanish press had been
substantially weakened by the politically unstable decades leading up to the Spanish Civil
War as well as the turmoil ofthe Civil War itself During the war, groups from both the
left and the right were known to siege or shut down opposite-leaning periodicals. An
example of this can be found within the history of ABC. Since its start in 1903, ABC has
been known as a traditionally rightward-leaning paper. In 1936, however. Popular Front
forces took over the paper’s office in Madrid and began publishing issues with a pro-
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leftist slant. In reaction to the siege of the paper’s Madrid office, owner Torcuata Luca de
Tena opened a second ABC office in Seville—an office that continued to run nationalist
supporting content. The contrast between the Madrid and Seville offices can be seen in
the headlines the two papers ran the day the Civil War broke out (see Figure 2-1, p. 35)
(ABC Newspaper). The front page of the ABC Madrid paper(on the left ofthe figure)
read “/ Viva la republicaT or “Long Live the Republic!” while the Seville edition (on the
right) featured the headline,"'Viva EspamC or “Long Live Spain.” This ABC example is
unique because the publication was able to open a second office after the seizure of its
headquarters; however this case is significant in a broader sense because it reflects the
precarious nature of the periodical press during the Civil War.
Statistics reflect the alarming decrease in the number of periodicals during the
Spanish Civil War. In 1920, there were 41 daily newspapers in Madrid. By the end ofthe
war in 1939, however,just four remained. Because the Press Law of 1938 had given the
government the power of“regulating the number and size of periodical publications,” the
recovery ofthe Spanish press following the Civil War was a slow and one-sided process.
By 1944, Madrid had nine daily periodicals—just five more than at the end ofthe war.
Nationwide, in 1920 Spain had 290 dailies. In 1944 there were just 104(Schulte 20, 21).
These statistics show that the Franco regime indeed exercised the first power given to it
in Article One of the Press Law of 1938. With control over the number of periodical
publications within the nation, the government was able to suppress the restoration of and
prevent the emergence of leftward-leaning periodicals. The liberal or left-wing press was
totally silenced, and only one voice, one opinion and one set of ideals filled the pages of
the Spanish periodical press for years to come (Stanley 99).
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Participating in the designation ofdirective personnel
Two of the main ways the Franco regime exerted power over the Spanish press
was by having hands-on influence over who exactly worked in each newsroom and by
threatening the publications and individual journalists with potential punishments. First,
each publication’s editor was either approved by or appointed by the authoritarian
government(Tusell 17). A concept known as the “responsible editor” was also enacted,
putting total legal authority in the hands of one person in each newsroom. The
“responsible editor,” also known as the director, was held legally accountable for any
unauthorized content published by the paper or any transgressions made by individuals
connected with the publication. Each director was approved by the Ministry ofthe
Interior and had to be registered in a National Registry of Journalists (Schulte 13). In
being held legally responsible for the publication, the director had an enormous
responsibility to prohibit any content that could be seen by the regime as offensive or
harmful to the State. Individual reporters also had to be approved by the government,
giving the regime total control over all personnel in the profession. The application
process to obtain a journalistic license was a tough one. Less than half ofthose requesting
permission to work in the profession were actually accepted (Tusell 17).
Article 18 of the Press Law of 1938 stated that the Ministry could punish any
publication that “directly, or indirectly, may tend to reduce the prestige ofthe Nation or
Regime, to obstruct the work of the government ofthe new State, or sow pernicious ideas
among the intellectually weak”(Schulte 13). With the vague wording of this article, the
law basically outlawed any information unflattering to the regime. Punishments for
including information deemed to “reduce the prestige of the Nation or Regime” ranged
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from slight to severe. Fines were a common penalty and ranged on the lighter side ofthe
spectrum. Because they were legally responsible, if any transgression occurred, directors
could be removed from that publication or possibly from the journalistic profession as a
whole. More severely, the publication itself could face confiscation or could be shut
down (Schulte 14). With direct control over who worked for the publications and with the
power to punish any slight transgression, the regime had very specific, tangible controls
over the Spanish press. The next power mentioned in the Press Law of 1938, although
more abstract in definition, solidified the government’s power over the press.

Ordering thejournalistic profession
The right of“ordering the Journalistic profession” was the most open-ended and
authoritative control given to the Spanish government over the press. With the Franco
regime having the control to “order the profession,” it was therefore given the control to
actually define the nature and scope ofjournalism itself within the country. The ability to
define the purpose ofjournalism was taken from the hands ofjournalists themselves and
placed under the authoritative control of Franco’s regime.
In The Elements ofJournalism, Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel stated that “the
principles and purpose ofjournalism are defined by something more basic: the function
news plays in the lives of people”(Kovach and Rosenstiel 11). By this definition, the
purpose ofjournalism is naturally defined by the public, by the people for whom the
news is written. Based on what the public needs and desires to know,journalists deliver
information accordingly. Putting the power to “order the journalistic profession’' in the
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hands of the regime, however, gave the government the authority to decide what the
public could or could not know.
The preamble of the Spanish Press Law of 1938 stated that the purpose of the new
law was “to awaken in the press the idea of service to the State...”(Schulte 13). The
press law stated that, “The existence of a fourth estate cannot be tolerated. It is
inadmissible that the press can exist outside ofthe State. The evils that spring from
‘freedom of the democratic kind’ must be avoided .. . The press should always serve the
national interests; it should be a national institution, a public enterprise of the service of
the State”(International Commission of Jurists 48). The 1938 press law defined service
to the Spanish State, rather than service to the public, as the primary purpose ofthe
Spanish press. This ability to order and define the journalistic profession was one of the
first and most restrictive powers given to the government by the Press Law of 1938.

Supervising Press Activity
With appointed officials and approved professionals in the newsrooms,the
government had strong control over the activity of the press and the content published in
national periodicals. Today, ABC and other Spanish national periodicals publish stories
on a wide range of subjects, including local and international politics, the economy,
science and technology, sports, culture, entertainment and opinion (ABC.es). Under the
censorship of the Franco regime, however, the Spanish press reported on a very limited
scope of subjects. For all practical purposes, politics, both local and national, went
uncovered by the Spanish press during the dictatorship.
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Rather than covering politics, the press focused on feature stories, sports and
entertainment news. Feature stories are narrative pieces that provide an interesting or
entertaining account or description of an individual, group or event. Feature stories,
sports reporting, international information and entertainment news made up a large
majority of the content published by Spanish papers under the Franco regime. In 1960,
feature stories, sports, religion and entertainment took up 34.7 percent ofthe editorial
space of La Vanguardia, a morning newspaper published in Barcelona. Only 2 percent of
content contained political news, and the paper ran over 13 times more international or
foreign news than it did local and national political news(See Figure 2-2)(Schulte 22,
23). So from movie stars to soccer, Germany to the United States, periodicals covered
almost all topics except what was happening within the Spanish political spectrum,
reflecting the regime’s success in supervising the activity ofthe Spanish press.

Censoring All Publications
The government’s freedom to censor publications was not limited to the press.
The regime had control over all written materials, including textbooks, novels and
scientific work as well. With the ability to censor all types of publications came the
power to inject the Franco regime’s political propaganda into every aspect of Spanish
society. Pro-Franco propaganda appeared in almost every national document, newspaper
and book published during the time. Under the Franco regime, word problems in math
books featured soldiers, military jargon and other pro-nationalist and pro-military
propaganda, reflecting the regime’s influence over all aspects of society (Payne 95, 96).

21

There was censorship of artistic and literary work as well. The two generations
preceding the Spanish Civil War have been referred to as the “Silver Age” of Spanish
literature. Artistically, literarily and scientifically, Spanish figures gained national and
international acclaim for their work during these years. The renowned paintings of artists
such as Pablo Picasso and Salvador Dali and the writings ofsocial and natural scientists
like historian Rafael Altamira justify the flattering term “Silver Age” in reference to the
Spanish intellectual and artistic achievements ofthis period (Payne 97). Following the
start of the Franco dictatorship and the promulgation ofthe Press Law of 1938, however,
the production of internationally renowned literary and artistic works from Spain
declined significantly, due to the repressive censorship outlined in the new law.
As discussed earlier in the chapter, urban intellectuals made up a substantial
portion of the leftist Popular Front. With the Republican forces’ loss to the Nationalists in
1939, these urban intellectuals and other Popular Front supporters fell under the total
control of the anti-liberal, anti-individualist regime. Under Franco’s dictatorship, any
oppositional or challenging viewpoints, whether direct or indirect, were censored.
Unfortunately, this included artistic, social and scientific work as well. Under the
dictatorship, the ^'Falangist intelligentsia'^ surfaced as the major intellectual force in
Spanish society. This Falangist intelligentsia, however, channeled “nostalgic
romanticism” and “fascistic irrationality” and produced very few internationally
appreciated artistic or literary works(Delgada Idarreta 220). Their work, like the
propaganda flooding almost all printed publications throughout the nation, served to
advance the nationalist and anti-liberal cause of the Franco government.
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Effects on the Two Fundamental Elements of Journalism
With the Press Law of 1938, General Francisco Franco and his authoritative
government had complete control over Spanish press. With the government’s ability to
order and define the profession and censor all publications, and with the presence of
government appointed officials in the newsrooms themselves, severe restrictions were in
place over what could or could not be published by the periodicals. So what exactly did
this censored press look like? What did a publication under censorship publish? And
what effect did this censorship have on the press’ ability to deliver the basic, fundamental
elements ofjournalism? The first journalistic element to observe is the press’ obligation
to the truth.

Is the press'first obligation to the truth?
One of the press’ most fundamental jobs is to deliver the truth—^to deliver
relevant and factual information to the public. With strict controls over what it could or
could not publish, did the Spanish press adhere to the fundamental journalistic principle
of reporting the truth? Superficially, it did—but in reality, it did not. The evidence behind
the press’ superficial commitment to the truth can be seen in the oath that each Spanish
journalist took during the years ofthe dictatorship. The oath stated: “I swear before God,
for Spain and its leader, to serve the Unity, the Greatness and the Freedom ofthe
Fatherland with complete and total faithfulness to the principles ofthe Spanish State,
without ever permittingfalse-hood, craft, or ambition to distort my pen in its daily labor’
(Schulte 25).
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The oath included a vow to truthfulness, against “ever permitting false-hood”—
implying an obligation and dedication to the truth. However, the tendency ofthe Spanish
periodical press under the Franco regime was not to lie by the distortion of truth, but
rather to lie by omission. By filling the papers’ pages with feature stories, sports
information, advertisements and photographs, there was a severe lack of hard news,
investigative reporting and enterprise reporting throughout the Spanish press, limiting the
complete truthfulness that the publications could deliver.
During the Spanish Civil War, both the Nationalists and the Popular Front were
known to have killed thousands of people on the opposing side. However, it is vaguely
estimated that following the Nationalists’ victory in 1939, possibly more than 100,000
people were executed by the Franco regime, simply for being associated with the proRepublican left(Payne 112, 113). Although various attempts have been made over the
past few decades to gather exact death toll statistics, no set statistic has yet been reached.
A major reason that no statistics can be accounted for is the lack of investigative
reporting done by the Spanish press under the Franco dictatorship. By its commitment to
reporting the truth,journalism as a profession has the important role in societies of
documenting information. Because of the censorship under the decades of dictatorship,
the Spanish press was unable to report wrong-doings, crimes and even murders
committed by the Franco regime. Without having had a free press as the truthful scribe of
society, documentation ofsome aspects oftwentieth-century society under Franco is
severely lacking. Although the Spanish press may have printed accurate information,
censorship of the press led to lies by omission that were detrimental to the society,
evolution and documentation of the history of the Spanish state.
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Does the press provide citizens with information necessaryfor them to live their day-today lives?
In addition to an obligation to the truth, a fundamental element ofjournalism is to
provide the people with information necessary for them to live their everyday lives.
Because the government had the control of“supervising the activity of the press,” the
scope of the nation's press was severely limited. As explained earlier in the chapter, the
majority of the content of the Spanish press was devoted to feature stories, sports,
religion and entertainment—somewhat trivial matters in the everyday lives ofthe Spanish
public during this period.
Under Franco, Spanish reporters were punished for writing about topics that
would seem to hold extreme importance in a person’s day-to-day life. In terms of public
safety, a poliomyelitis epidemic is significant information to include in a national
periodical. However, as reported by the International Commission of Jurists, one Spanish
reporter said that under Franco, he was arrested and issued fines for a story he wrote
about just that. Among other newsmen reported by the Commission of Jurists to have
received citations was one who reported on a deficit in the orange crop and another who
pointed out defects in a public housing project (Schulte 25).
So, what exactly could publications print under the Franco regime? The following
information reflects the findings of a case study from the ABC Seville issue published on
June 1, 1947. The issue had a total of22 pages, six of which were devoted to feature
articles, sports and entertainment information; five pages contained international news;
two featured national news; two provided local news from within Seville; and the
remaining seven pages contained advertisements. Out of the available editorial space, 40
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percent was soft news, or feature, sports and entertainment stories, 33.3 percent was
devoted to foreign news, 13.3 percent was given to national news and an equal 13.3
percent was given for local news(see Figure 2-3)(ABC.es Hemeroteca). The small
percentage of both categories reflects the Franco regime’s intent in downplaying both
national and local political news, keeping the public in the dark about what was occurring
within the Spanish government on all levels. With lighthearted feature stories filling the
pages of the national periodicals, the Spanish public was being denied important
information necessary in their day-to-day lives, therefore reflecting the failure ofthe
Spanish press during this time to deliver this second fundamental element ofjournalism.
The cover of the June 1, 1947 paper features a large photo of Native-Americans
with the headline “‘‘Somos Norteamericanos^’’' or “We are North Americans.” One ofthe
most widely read national Spanish newspapers boasted a front page featuring NativeAmericans from North America. This cover article reflects the Spanish press under
Franco’s hefty coverage of international affairs. This is also reflected on pages nine, 10,
11 and 13, which featured articles entitled “The Political Situation in Italy,” “The
Political Situation in Hungary,

The Chinese Civil War,” and “North American Politics

(ABC.es Hemeroteca).
The two pages devoted to national news, pages seven and eight, reported Franco’s
approaching visit to Madrid. The headline reads, “At 7 o’clock tomorrow night, His
Excellence, the Chief of State, will arrive in Madrid.” The story goes on to tell of the
caudillo’s planned visit and his previous travels around the country, and it continues onto
the following page to report the travels of Franco’s wife and daughter as well. “The
caudillo's wife and daughter will return to Madrid,” one headline reads. These articles are
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the only national news that the issue contains and are reflective of the content ofthe
Spanish press during this time(ABC.es Hemeroteca). Rather than reporting details on the
possible political motives behind Franco's visit to Madrid, the paper treated the trip as a
feature story—lightheartedly reporting the who, what, where and when of the situation
rather than answering the meaningful why.
The two pages containing local news offer official messages from local
government administrators, messages that announce an upcoming lunar eclipse and
public transportation information. Page five includes a feature article on artist Jose Maria
Labrador, and there are other arts and entertainment pages reporting upcoming theater
shows, sports scores, marriage announcements and anniversary notices(ABC.es
Hemeroteca). The inclusion of these messages delivered straight from government
officials reflects the role of the press as a public relations vehicle for the Franco regime.
With these stories, the periodical published exactly what the government wanted to say,
literally word for word and line by line. Also, this wide array of feature topics reflects the
paper’s emphasis on soft news and its virtual avoidance of hard news, enterprise or
breaking news stories.
Other case studies from this period report similar findings. On June 1, 1948, June
1, 1949 and June 1, 1954, feature stories, sports and entertainment news made up the
majority of the issues’ editorial content—with majorities coming in at 64 percent, 42
percent and 60 percent. In 1947, 1948 and 1949 the lengths of the issues studied were 22,
14 and 16 pages, and in the 1954 case study the length had increased to 44 pages. This
increased length is a trend that will be explored in detail in Chapter Three. Careful
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examination of these three additional case studies reveals the same trends and failures as
those described in detail with the June 1. 1947 study.
These findings are reflective of the failures and trends of the Spanish press during
the years of the Franco dictatorship. Further evidence to these claims can be found in the
following obser\^ation made by historian James Cleugh in 1953 about the periodical press

in Spain:
[Newspapers] are not read for enlightenment, nor even primarily for information
about happenings at home ... They are read for foreign news, which is usually
printed without comment, and above all for their numerous and judicious articles
of a non-political, mainly cultural kind. In Spain, the newspaper reader has a host
of opinions on every subject but politics. In the Anglo-Saxon and French press,
the reader has a host of views on the political party which he favors, but lacks
information on other subjects.(Cleugh 140)

As a result of the Press Law of April 22, 1938, the regime was able to define the
press. The government had the power to say what would or would not be published and it
exercised its authority by punishing any publications that tried to deviate from its
restrictions. Although there were articles here and there that slipped through the cracks of
the strict censorship, they were few and far between. The national press delivered to the
Spanish citizenry a carefully calculated and narrow view ofthe public’s own nation—a
view painted by the authoritarian government.
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Edging towards Change
The Press Law of 1938 outlawed the publication of any opposing or less-thanflattering viewpoints of the Franco regime. Facing such a strict and all-inclusive law,the
media and the public had almost no ability to resist or speak out against the censorship of
the press. Flowever, after over a decade of no resistance, criticism ofthe Press Law of
1938 began to surface in the 1950s and early 1960s. The most significant and influential
source of criticism came from the Catholic Church.
In the early 1950s, both Father Jesus Irabarren, editor of Ecclesia, a weekly
publication printed by the Catholic Action group, and Enrique Cardinal Pla y Deniel,
Primate of Spain at the time, spoke out in criticism against the censorship ofthe Spanish
press (Schulte 37). Cardinal Pla y Deniel wrote,‘it is highly deplorable that it is not
recognized that between the liberties of damnation—^the unrestrained license of the press
for cheating and corrupting the public, always condemned by the Church—and the
absolute state control of the press, exists a happy medium of a responsible freedom of the
press, proper to a Christian and civilized society”(Schulte 31). This quote expresses a
major figure in the Catholic Church’s desire for a more middle-of-the-road press—a press
with the freedoms and liberties that were at the time being fundamentally denied to the
Spanish media.
At the same time these criticisms were being voiced, the political and social
atmosphere within the nation was beginning to change. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s,
Spain’s international isolation began to loosen, exposing the country to more liberal
economic, social and political influences from abroad and leading the nation to its
eventual transition to democracy. The transition, however, was a slow one
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ispecially in

terms of the liberalization of the Spanish press. This is reflected by a particular cabinet
change that occurred in the 1950s. In 1951, the Ministry ofInformation and Tourism was
created with jurisdiction over the press, tourism and propaganda within the nation.
Because they are, in essence, public relations vehicles for a country, the grouping ofthe
periodical press with tourism and propaganda reflects the government’s continued
political manipulation of and dominance over the Spanish press.
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CHAPTER III: The Spanish Press during the Transition to Democracy(1960—1976)

Political, Social and Economic Background
On November 20, 1975, flags throughout Spain flew at half mast. After 38 years
of authoritarian rule. General Francisco Franco died at age 82, leaving behind a legacy of
repression, hesitant hopes for democracy, and overall domestic and international
uncertainty over the future of the Spanish State. For more than a decade, the question of
“After Franco, what?” had circulated throughout the country and the world; and on the
day of the dictator’s death, the question still remained unanswered (“Spain: After Franco:
Hope and Fear”). Prior to his death. Franco famously stated that the future ofthe Spanish
government was '"'‘atado y bien atado''' or that things were “all tied up” and scrupulously
planned out(Ross 5). This assurance, however, soon proved to be false.
On paper, the transition of power following Franco’s death went as he had
planned. Legally, the nation had been prepared for the restoration of the monarchy for
decades. In 1947 Franco had signed into effect the Law of Spanish Succession, officially
defining Spain as a kingdom and setting up for a future transition to monarchial rule. Two
days after Franco’s death. Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon, grandson of King Alfonso XIII,
was sworn in as King of Spain,just as Franco had arranged almost three decades before
(“BBC on this Day’’). Immediately after being sworn in as King, Juan Carlos confirmed
francoist Carlos Arias Navarro as Prime Minister. The dictator had originally planned for
pro-authoritarian Admiral Luis Carrero to be named Prime Minister; however, in 1973
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Carrero was killed in an unexpected accident(Ross 5-7). Despite this one glitch, power
was transferred just as Franco had drawn out.
In reality, however. Franco's plan to keep government controls in the hands of
pro-authoritarian, conservative leaders was altogether unsuccessful. Following two
decades of major social and economic change, the nation was poised for a total
transformation. During a speech at his inaugural ceremonies. King Juan Carlos employed
diction hinting at democratic reform, addressing a transition that had, in many ways,
already begun(“BBC on this Day*’). In July 1976, Juan Carlos convinced Carlos Arias
Navarro to step down as Prime Minister, appointing liberal ffancoist Adolfo Su^ez in his
place. Suarez’s appointment has been labeled as the beginning of Spain’s legal transicion
democrdtica^ or transition to democracy (Ross 7).
Within five months of his appointment, Suarez successfully pushed for the
Political Reform Act of 1976, calling for democratic elections of a new parliament. After
decades of totalitarian rule, democracy officially arrived in Spain with the signing ofthis
new legislation. Within a year and a month of Franco’s death, the nation was legally
transformed from dictatorship to democracy. Signs of this transition, however, had begun
to surface as early as the 1950s, as a result of many social, economic and international
factors.

Forces towards Democracy
International isolation was a dominating characteristic ofthe first decades of
Franco’s regime. Diplomatically, economically and culturally, Spain was entirely
secluded from the rest of Western Europe and the world. One ofthe major ways Franco
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kept this isolation intact was through political and social propaganda forced upon the
Spanish public. As described in Chapter Two,the Press Law of 1938 put control of media
content in the hands of the government. With that control, pro-Francoist propaganda
circulated throughout the nation, feeding society a forced sense of nationalism which, in
turn, hardened the nation's international isolation even more.
This isolation stayed firm until the mid-1950s, when signs of increased
participation in the worldwide community first began to show. On September 26, 1953,
Franco signed a “mutual defense assistance agreement” with the United States in
exchange for tax relief—one of the first pieces of international diplomatic legislation
signed by the authoritarian Spanish State. This start of international diplomacy began to
thaw the isolation that had been frozen in place around the nation for over a decade(50
Years 6, 13). As a result of increased global diplomatic participation, Spain underwent
major economic and social changes throughout the 1950s and 1960s, resulting in a slight
loosening of Franco’s unchecked authoritative control over the Spanish state.
One area of Spanish society that underwent a major transition was the nation’s
economic policy. Between the 1940s and the 1970s, Spain’s economy shifted from being
under strict governmental control and isolated from international markets to being more
liberal, capitalistic and part of the global market. Overall, this transition greatly helped
the economy. The 1940s were known as the “years of hunger,” brought on by the
destruction of the Spanish Civil War. The nation’s agricultural output was severely
damaged by the war, and levels of production and consumption were at an all time low.
Throughout the forties and fifties, the Franco regime exercised complete control over the
economy, with interventionism as a major component ofthe nation’s economic policy.
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Fiscal recover>' following the war was slow, and national income levels matching those
before the Civil War were not reached until 1951 (Carr and Fusi 49-52). This
interventionism and international economic isolation remained in place until the late
1950s.
In February 1957. the government underwent positional and ministerial changes,
the most significant of which was the arrival of Opus Dei to Spanish politics. Opus Dei
was the first official secular institution of the Catholic Church, and today it is selfdescribed as a conservative Catholic group with the mission “to help people turn their
work and daily activities into occasions for growing closer to God,for serving others, and
for improving society"(Opus Dei). Members of the group were appointed to ministerial
positions within the Spanish government and, therefore, had power over major economic
and social decisions.
Credited as being a major force behind the modernization of Spanish society.
Opus Dei technocrats introduced policies that integrated Spain into international
economic markets (Spain: Opus Dei). The interventionism and isolation ofthe past two
decades faded, and in its place came an increased participation in international markets
and a liberalization of the Spanish economy. There came an explosion of new industries
and substantial growth in the production of older ones. The automobile, food processing
and construction industries all expanded rapidly, along with older industries such as ship
building. With the loosening of the nation’s international isolation, both exports and
imports increased as well. The transition is reflected well with the contrast between the
following two quotations. In 1953, Cleugh wrote,“The outlook for Spain’s foreign trade
cannot yet be a rosy one”(195). But by the 1970s, this outlook had certainly changed:
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Foreign investment was encouraged by allowing the repatriation of profits and the
importation of advanced technology by permitting royalty payments. Spain became part
of the world capitalist economy'*(Carr and Fusi 54). These changes led to what became
known as the “economic miracle" of the 1960s. In this decade, the Spanish economy had
almost unparalleled capitalistic growth, matched only by that of Japan (Carr and Fusi 49).
The most significant industrial growth, however, brought social transformations
as well as economic changes to the nation. The service industry, especially tourism,
underwent the most substantial economic growth during the 1960s. Tourism rates, which
had showed slight signs of growth in the 1950s, grew exponentially in the 1960s, and by
1973, over 30 million tourists visited Spain annually, providing a yearly profit of3 billion
dollars (Carr and Fusi 57). With tourists from Western Europe flooding the country,
Spanish society was introduced to liberalized social norms in addition to its more
profitable economy. Two-piece bathing suits and bare arms and legs filled the beaches of
Spain, introducing modem Western European trends and styles. After decades of cultural
isolation, Spanish society was beginning to come in contact with examples offreedom of
expression and liberalization in ways it had never seen.
The social changes of the 1960s did not stop at two-piece bathing suits or a slight
loosening of social norms. From the start of his dictatorship. Franco’s regime had
maintained extremely close ties to the Catholic Church. Raised a devout Catholic and
having been supported by the Church during the Civil War, Franco had incorporated
“National Catholicism" into the patchwork of the Spanish State, an ideology that, at least
on the surface, had been strictly adhered to by the public for decades(Payne 1, 2).
However, during the late-1950s and 1960s, with capitalistic ideals influencing the
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national economy and new social standards filling the shores of the beaches to the streets
of the cities, a shift in the social mores of Spanish society occurred—including a trend
towards secularization: “Secularization marched hand in hand with the lifestyle of a car
owning, holiday-taking society"(Carr and Fusi 100). So, in addition to diplomatic and
economic shifts tow ards liberalization of the Spanish State, social norms,including those
related to religion, shifted as well. “To the liberal middle classes, for whom economic
conditions were easier, democracy offered the attraction of greater intellectual and artistic
freedom. To younger Spaniards in general it promised a more relaxed and enjoyable
lifestyle’*(Ross 6).
Although these economic and social changes permeated the country unevenly and
at varying rates, the changes were indeed present and ongoing. With a speedily
modernizing society. Franco's authoritarian government was becoming more and more
outdated in the international and national scope. The regime’s strict, heavy-handed
control over Spanish society seemed out of place with the bikinis on the beaches and the
new liberalized international economy and diplomacy. Criticism against the dictatorship
became louder and more widespread throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Surfacing in the
form of student protests, regional discontent and working-class demonstrations,
displeasure with the archaic government became hard to ignore (Carr and Fusi 133-160).
After decades of economic and social changes and an increase in criticism and
protest. Franco’s regime conceded to an expansion of citizens’ individual liberties and
freedom of expression

to a degree. This transition towards democracy occurred in

regards to the Spanish press as well, surfacing in the form of the 1966 Press and Print
Law, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The new, more democratically
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inspired press law took the place of the repressive 1938 Press Law that had called for
censorship of all printed materials. So from diplomacy to the economy to society and to
the press, the Spanish State underw^ent a more than decade-long process of liberalization,
a transition to democracy that took true form with the Political Reform Act of 1976.

Challenges in Creating a Denwcracy
Although both King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Su^ez had democracy in
mind following Franco's death in 1975. creating a democracy from the legal structures of
an authoritarian government was a daunting task. The job proved to be difficult because
of prior measures put in place by Franco, and many in the country and throughout the
world were skeptical of the leaders' ability to make the transition a success (‘‘Spain: After
Franco: Hope and Fear’'). On December 6, 1975, the American magazine The Nation ran
a letter that the members of an Ad Hoc Committee for a Democratic Spain had written to
United States President Gerald Ford following the death of Franco. The letter expressed
the concerns members of the Spanish government had regarding the hopeful transition
from dictatorship to democracy and asked the United States’ president for help on
making the transition a success. The following excerpt reflects the challenges and
potential limitations that faced the transition:
The new ruler of Spain does not come to his post as a free agent. He wears the
mantle placed on his shoulders by Franco. Guardians and advisers are Franco’s
men, chosen by him, loyal to Franco’s precepts, skilled in the execution of
Franco’s policies. Twenty years of training in statecraft in Franco Spain, under
Franco's tutelage, provide no assurance that Spain’s new King has the desire, or
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will, or capacity, or courage or fortitude to abolish the totalitarian regime which is
his inheritance.(Shirer and Tuchnan 582)
Newly sworn in King Juan Carlos indeed wore a “mantle placed on his shoulders
by Franco." With the 1947 Law of Succession, Spain had been named a monarchy, with
Franco serving as Head of State. By that law. Franco gave himself the power to choose
the successor of the Spanish kingdom. Within the Bourbon lineage, former Spanish King
Alfonso VIIFs son Don Juan was next in line for the throne. Franco, however,saw Don
Juan as a liberal threat to the conser\'ative Spanish State. So, in 1948, a year after the Law
of Succession was signed. Franco convinced Don Juan to allow for his ten-year-old son
Juan Carlos, who was living in Portugal, to move to Spain and be educated and mentored
under the control of General Franco himself(Cavendish). Thus began King Juan Carlos’
“training in statecraft in Franco['s] Spain.’* With the ability to name a carefully raised,
purposely trained successor as Head of the Spanish State, Franco certainly had influence
over the transfer of power that was to follow his death.
In addition to Franco’s legal control over the future ofthe nation, a major
challenge to the transition to democracy was the repressive history of the dictatorship
itself. As described in Chapter Two,for 38 years, the Franco regime had silenced public
opinion and personal expression. Despite the diplomatic, economic and social trends
towards liberalization that had ensued during the late-1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the fact of
the matter was that, until the day of his death. Franco still had authoritative control over
all of Spanish society. In the letter written to President Ford, the Ad Hoc Committee for a
Democratic Spain wrote:
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Since 1930. after Franco's defeat of the legal Republican government of Spain
with the arms and armies of Hitler and Mussolini, an unremitting reign ofterror
has enslaved the Spanish people, denied them elementary human rights and Spain
as a whole the validity and benefits of a free society. The practices ofterror were
legalized by virtue of law s promulgated by the totalitarian state established by
Franco w^hen he assumed powder on April 1, 1939. This totalitarian state, its laws
and its practices still exist, imrepudiated, in Spain today... (Shirer and Tuchnan
581-582).
When Franco died in 1975, in spite of increased international diplomacy, a more
capitalistic economy, and legislation such as the 1966 Press and Print Law, Spain was
still very much a totalitarian state being denied "The validity and benefits of a free
society.

The Political Reform Act of1976
Despite the challenges and doubts facing the transition. King Juan Carlos and
Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez did indeed transform Spain, by law, from a dictatorship to
a democracy. As previously mentioned, the first decisive moment in the legal
transformation came in July 1976 when King Juan Carlos succeeded in encouraging
Carlos Arias Navarro to resign as Prime Minister. Arias had been appointed to the
position in 1973 by Franco himself; and, despite his reputation as a “timid liberalizer,”
outside of the authoritative scope of Franco's regime. Arias proved to be much less of a
liberalizer than his reputation had led on (Ross 7). Throughout his three years as Prime
Minister, Arias failed to take any real steps towards democratizing Spain. However, with
the appointment of Suarez following Arias' resignation, the transition was underway.
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Suarez, who was a former secretary-general of Franco's political party, the
National Movement, was well-versed in the ins and outs ofthe Franco-regime’s laws.
Having an in-depth understanding of the prior legislation, Suarez was able to work within
the guidelines of the old regulations in order to create new legislation allowing for the
democratization of the Spanish government. Within five months of his appointment as
Prime Minister, Suarez convinced the Franco-appointed national Parliament, or Cortes, to
vote itself out of power. The Political Reform Act, or la Ley de Reforma PoHtica, was
ratified in a national referendum in December 1976 and called for the democratic election
of a new Cortes. The act was the first official piece of democratic legislation signed after
Franco's death and it signaled the start of the legal transformation from dictatorship to
democracy (Ross 7).

Effects of the Transition on the Spanish Press
For decades following the enactment of the 1938 Press Law,the Spanish press
had been suffocating beneath the legislation’s numerous articles calling for complete
censorship. The state of the Spanish press, constrained and directed by the authoritarian
government, as described in Chapter Two,remained practically stagnant for nearly 30
years. The press’ failure to deliver truthful, complete and relevant coverage of national
affairs and politics continued, and the pendulum of the Spanish press remained frozen to
the right. However, by the 1960s, the social and political shifts sweeping the nation had
reached the Spanish press.
In 1959 a special commission was formed to discuss possible revisions to the
Press Law of 1938, which, in the words of regime spokeswoman Angela Martinez de
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Banos, was “somewhat out of date, considering the dynamism and the needs of modem
journalism”(Schulte 39). A rough draft of the commission’s recommended revisions was
completed within a year; suggestions included the end of prepublication censorship as
well as the overall forfeit of governmental controls over the press. For the Franco regime,
this proposed legislation was radical. For regime critics, however, it was almost
humorous. One stated:
.. . it is so ridiculous that one wonders if it is possible that it could really become
law in a modem state in the middle of the twentieth century. It provides, basically.
for the following: pre-publication censorship of the press and magazines is ended.
but it defines a most detailed and endless series of“Crimes ofthe Press, so
unprecedented that were they to be applied in any other country ofthe so-called
free world, like France, England or the United States, it would mean the end of all
publications. This list includes “crimes” of action and omission, and they range to
everything from criticizing the regime or its officials to failing to give adequate
importance to a speech by Franco or some “success” ofthe regime.(Schulte 3940)
Although these recommendations were proposed in 1960, plans to revise the press law
were halted, due to feuds between members of the special commission, which included
Church officials and Ministry of Information officials. It was not until 1962 that any
substantial changes were introduced to the press legislation.
The first step towards the democratization of the Spanish press came on July 10,
1962 with the appointment of Manuel Fraga Iribame as head ofthe Ministry of
Information and Tourism. Soon after being appointed, Fraga eliminated prepublication
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censorship of the Spanish press. Except for in Madrid and Barcelona where political
opinion was at its most concentrated, daily editions were no longer “blue-penciled,”

or

edited by government-controlled censors prior to publication (Schulte 23). This
appointment of Fraga and the regime’s subsequent surrender of prior censorship mark the
start of the Spanish press’ own transition to democracy.
After eliminating prepublication censorship, Fraga promised the nation a new
liberalized press law by the end of 1962. This promise, however, proved to be overly
ambitious. Over the following years, Fraga delivered varied and often contradictory
opinions of and promises to the Spanish press. In some instances he seemed wary of
journalistic reform, expressing fears of the potential dangers of a completely free press.
In others, however, he spoke in strong support of delivering those freedoms of expression
and speech to journalism in Spain. In a 1964 article written by a foreign correspondent
with the Manchester paper The Guardian, Fraga was quoted saying,“We want to
encourage all free discussion which is in the national interest,” reflecting his support ofa
more liberalized, free press (“Franco’s Finesse”).
While a desire for a more liberal press certainly came from within Spain, the
Spanish government was forced to recognize and give merit to the idea of updating the
press law as a result of international diplomatic factors as well. As the nation began to
participate more and more in international diplomacy and foreign markets, Spain’s
worldwide image became a cause for concern. After years of increased capitalization,
heavy tourism from Western Europe, and a loosening of social mores, the strict
censorship of the Spanish press contrasted sharply with the signs of liberalization that
were coming from all sides. The contrast looked foolish in the eyes of domestic as well as
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foreign observers. Spanish poet and political commentator Dionysio Ridruejo wrote the
following in an article entitled ‘‘Spain’s Restless Voices,” published in Catholic World in
May, 1963: “The present government can no longer exert the control it once did over
communications ...[for the government] depends in large measure upon the good will of
international opinion”(Schulte 6). Following years of international as well as domestic
pressures from all sides, a new press law was finally passed in 1966.

The 1966 Press and Print Law
On April 9, 1966,la Ley de Prensa e Imprenta, or the Spanish Press and Print
Law of 1966, was approved by General Francisco Franco. Answering more than a decade
of pressures for greater liberalization ofthe Spanish press, the law took the place ofthe
overwhelmingly restrictive Press Law of 1938. The signing of this legislation was the
fifth and most recent pivotal moment in the history ofthe Spanish press. After almost
three decades of hanging along the right side of its trajectory, the pendulum of the
Spanish press swung towards the left.
The Press and Print Law redefined the authoritative government’s control over the
media—loosening controls while including intentionally vague restrictions as well. The
Preface of the bill mentions previous policies regarding the Spanish press, including the
Press Law of 1938. The section goes on to specify that,“The mention of these dates
highlights the need to adapt those legal norms to the current aspirations ofthe Spanish
community and to the situation ofthe present times”(Ley 14/1966, Preface). This
statement reflects the government’s recognition ofthe cultural and social changes that
had ensued since the time of the Spanish Civil War, adding that the new legislation had.
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in fact, been tailored with these changes in mind. This acknowledgment of social and
international change reflects a transition in the regime’s attitude towards both the role of
the government and the role of the press.
The differences between the 1966 Press and Print Law and the Press Law of 1938
are clear, starting with the very first article of the new bill. Article One of the law is
labeled "^Libertad de expresion por medio de impresos,'^ or “Freedom of expression
through print.” In terms of tone, the 1966 legislation instantly differentiated itselffrom
the prior press law. Rather than outlining what rights were given to the government over
the press, the 1966 statute stated what rights were provided for the press—a significant
change in perspective and attitude. This article, the first and most explicit in terms of
giving freedom of content to the press, stated that the press was given “the right to the
diffusion of any information through print”(Ley 14/1966, Articulo 1). “Any information”
is a bold phrase and sharp departure from the jargon of the 1938 Press Law. With this
article, the power to define the journalistic profession was handed back to the actual
professionals ofthe field. With the ability to diffuse any information, the bill stated that
journalists would be put in charge of determining what information to actually publish,
thereby regaining control of their own occupation. This article clearly reflects a loosening
of authoritarian control over the press.
Article Three of the Press and Print Law made official what Fraga had previously
called for in 1962. The article states: “The Administration may not issue or require prior
censorship or compulsory consultation, except in states ofemergency and war expressly
provided for by law”(Ley 14/1966, Articulo 3). The end of prepublication censorship
was, with this language, officially worked into the legal patchwork of the nation. This
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article also, however, introduced the first of many vague restrictions that are scattered
throughout the 1966 Press and Print Law. With the clause, “except in states of emergency
and war expressly provided for by law,” the government subtly limited the freedom of
expression that had been outlined in Article One ofthe bill. With the power to determine
what constitutes a state of emergency, the government had the subsequent ability to
censure certain unspecified information and potentially punish publications.
Article Seven of the law, labeled “Right to official information,” displays another
fundamental difference between the old press law and the new. The article is divided into
two parts, the first stating: “1. The Government Administration and Public entities must
provide information on their actions to all periodicals and news agencies in the manner
determined by law or regulation”(Ley 14/1966, Articulo 7). With this article, the regime
recognized the right of the Spanish press to actually report on national politics and the
government itself As described in Chapter Two, under the Press Law of 1938, stories on
politics and governmental affairs were all but absent in the Spanish press. Article Seven,
however, allows for the press to have access to this information and, subsequently, for it
to be conveyed to the public—a major indication ofthe democratization ofthe Spanish
press.
The second half of Article Seven, however, displays yet another vague restriction
slipped into the new law. It states: “2. The activity ofthe specified bodies and the
Administration of Justice will be reserved when per provision ofthe Act or when the very
nature of the proceedings, arrangements or agreements are not public or if the documents
or acts which are formalized are declared to be reserved”(Ley 14/1966, Articulo 7).
Within the legal jargon of the second half of this article, it states that documents or
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information “declared to be reserved" can. in fact, be kept from the press and, therefore,
kept from the public. With this clause, the regime included yet another safeguard against
total freedom of the press.
The 1966 Press and Print Law contains five chapters and 72 individual articles.
These three before-mentioned articles include some ofthe most democratizing freedoms
provided by the new legislation. They also, however, contain subtle restrictions, signaling
a hesitation from the Franco regime to allow for total freedom of expression and total
freedom of the press. The mixture between extremely liberal articles and understated
restrictions creates an interesting combination of progress and pause. Article One—
labeled “Freedom of expression through print,” provided the press with freedom of
speech—a fundamental liberty of democracy and a flmdamental element of a free press.
However, as seen in the second clause of Article Three and the second half of Article
Seven, these new freedoms were not given without limitations. Throughout the nation’s
transition from dictatorship to democracy, the state of the Spanish press was in somewhat
of a limbo, balancing the government’s vague warnings with the simultaneously
presented freedoms of the new law. However, despite the haziness of some aspects ofthe
law, there was a definite improvement in the quality of the Spanish press between the
start of the transition and the end—in large part because ofthe 1966 Press and Print Law.

Effects on the Two Fundamental Elements of Journalism
Substantial differences can be seen between the quality of Spanish journalism in
the 1940s and of that in the 1960s. In the range of topics covered, the quality of reporting,
and the length of the individual issues themselves, ABC and other national newspapers
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expanded greatly between these decades. In terms of the two fundamental elements of
journalism discussed in previous chapters, the Spanish press saw significant improvement
over these years. Even further improvement can be seen between the press ofthe 1960s
and the reporting of the 1970s—with the quality of Spanish journalism continuing to
improve.

Does the press provide citizens M’ith information necessaryfor them to live their day-today lives?
One of the most important changes in the quality ofthe Spanish press between the
1940s and the 1960s was an increase in the scope of information covered throughout the
pages of the periodical. In order to provide citizens with necessary and pertinent
information, the press must report on situations, people and happenings that actually
affect the lives of the public that it serves. In comparing the June 1, 1947 issue ofABC
and the issue from May 5, 1960, the first and most obvious discrepancy between the two
was the difference in the actual length of the periodicals. The length of the daily
expanded greatly between the 1947 issue and the 1960 edition, as hinted at in the
previous chapter. In 1947, the paper was 22 pages long, seven of which were devoted to
advertisements. On May 5, 1960, however, the ABC issue was a total of 76 pages, with
30 pages of advertisements—a total increase of54 pages(ABC.es Hemeroteca). The
1960 issue had more than three times the amount of editorial space than the 1947 issuetranslating to three times the number of individual articles. The issues grew even longer
by 1970. The May 5, 1970 ABC issue consisted of 120 pages, 77 of which were devoted
to editorial content(ABC.es Hemeroteca). Although the high percentage of advertising
stayed consistent throughout these three different decades, the increase in overall pages
allowed for an increase of editorial space.
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With more space available for editorial content and the social and economic
forces of the nation's transfer to democracy at play, the 1960s and 1970s brought more
room for and an increased tolerance for an expansion ofthe topics covered in the pages of
the Spanish press. In the 1947 issue case study, feature stories, sports and international
news dominated the editorial content of the newspaper—making up almost three-fourths
of all editorial space. The remaining 25 percent was devoted to national and local news,
including politics, military and business information. In the I960 case study, the numbers
were similar, with 72 percent of the editorial content containing feature, or cultural
stories, sports news and international news. Although national news, politics, local news,
business, military, health and education information made up little more than one-fourth
of the content, the increase in editorial space from 1947 to 1960 meant an increase in
stories for each of the individual categories. In the 1960 issue, five pages contained
national political news, three featured enterprise stories on health and education, and four
contained business and economic news(ABC.es Hemeroteca)(see Figure 3-1).
The trend continued throughout the following decade. In the May 5,1970 ABC
issue, 74 percent of the editorial content was devoted to the same areas of emphasis as in
prior decades—feature stores, international news, sports and entertainment. However,
like the increase in 1960, the dramatic increase in overall editorial space led to the
inclusion of even more hard news stories in the publications—expanding and improving
the quality and scope of the other sections. In the 1970 issue, seven pages, or 9 percent of
editorial content, contained national and political news. An equivalent 9 percent covered
business and economic news as well(ABC.es Hemeroteca)(see Figure 3-2). Another
important change between these decades was the emergence of new sections in the
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periodical press. In the 1970 ABC issue, there was a breaking news and crime reports
section as well as, most importantly, an opinion column,two sections that had been
absent in each of the prior case studies.
One of the most significant changes in content between the 1947 and the 1960
issues was the growth in the number and quality of business and economic stories. On
May 5, 1960 a story entitled, "SPAR Espanola, Integrada en la SPAR Europea"" or.
Spanish SPAR,Integrated into the European SPAR,” ran on page 14 of the daily edition
of ABC. The story offered a description of the integration ofthe supermarket chain SPAR
in Spain with the European community of over 214 SPAR supermarkets(ABC.es
Hemeroteca). This story is significant in that it reported on changes occurring vrithin the
Spanish economy as well as the shifting international relations between Spain and other
Western European nations. Another story on the Spanish economy ran on pages 52 and
53 of this issue. The story provides a detailed chart o^''Las deudas del estadoC or ‘‘The
debts of the State.” The chart offers a close examination of the nation’s economyincluding numbers and statistics on the country’s spending habits(ABC.es Hemeroteca).
These in-depth stories reflect a presence of economically-focused enterprise
reporting in the Spanish press. According to a study done by Bu Zhong and John E.
Newhagen, content decisions made by journalists reflect current cultural values of a
society (590). The story describing Spain’s international economic interaction reflects the
shift in the cultural values of the country that had occurred—^the shift towards greater
capitalization of the Spanish economy. This economic trend and cultural value was
reported in even greater depth in the May 5, 1970 issue. One story reported that Spain
had consumed 3,050 million liters of gasoline in the year 1969 alone. Another gave an
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update on the expansion of the tourism industry—which, as discussed earlier, was a
major social and economic transition within the nation during the sixties and seventies
(ABC.es Hemeroteca). These in-depth stories on the Spanish economy, especially the
1960 chart of the nation's debt accumulation and spending habits, reflect an increase in
candidness between the press and the people—showing that there was indeed an
improvement in the press’ ability to deliver information necessary for citizens’ to live
their day-to-day lives.
This improvement was seen in other content shifts as well. In the May 5,1960
issue, page 50 featured both a story on cancer trends and an enterprise story on
parenthood. These articles reflect a deep, critical look at problems and trends in Spanish
society. This presence of the press’ critical, skeptical eye on the Spanish state
strengthened even more between 1960 and 1970. In the May 5, 1970 issue ofABC,page
33 reported various crime incidents, including murders, that had recently been
committed, and on the next page, a story reported that Spain had been ranked 30*
internationally in traffic deaths(ABC.es Hemeroteca). A departure ifrom the general lack
of hard news during the early decades of Franco’s dictatorship, these two stories reflect
the increasingly critical, watchful eye of the Spanish press. These general and specific
shifts demonstrate an improvement in the press’ ability to supply the public with
information that it needed. In short, the Spanish periodical press improved and succeeded
in delivering to the public this fundamental element ofjournalism throughout the
transition years of the Spanish state.
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Is the press 'first obligation to the truth?
As discussed in Chapter Two, during the first decades ofthe Franco regime, the
Spanish press failed in terms of the journalistic obligation to the truth—Shaving the
tendency to lie, not directly, but rather by the omission of extremely sigmficant
information. Between the 1940s and the 1960s, there was substantial improvement in
regard to this fundamental element ofJournalism as well. As stated in the previous
section, with the increase in length of the actual publication, there was an overall growth
of the editorial content within the periodical. This expansion of content served to provide
improved coverage of the daily happenings ofthe Spanish people—^thus avoiding a
failure by omission in its obligation to the truth.
One of the most extreme changes between the Spanish press ofthe 1940s and the
press of 1970 can be seen on page three of the May 5, 1970 issue, which featured an
opinion column that was named ''Opinar: Riesgo?' or “Voicing Opinion: Risk.” This
editorial actually critiques the fact that opinion columns were so scarce within the
press—a daring and strong claim against the repression ofthe Spanish press, written at a
time in which the nation was still under Franco’s authoritative rule(ABC.es
Hemeroteca). Published in 1970,four years after the signing ofthe Press and Print Law
of 1966, the presence and content of this opinion column demonstrates the loosening of
regime controls over the Spanish press. It also reflects a greater range of opinions and
angles in stories, further improving the paper’s obligation to the truth.
Providing “a forum for public criticism and compromise” is another fundamental
role of the press, and opinion columns help to broaden that public forum (Kovach and
Rosenstiel 166). As a reflection of the cultural norms of a society, as Zhong and
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^ewhagen describe, the presence of the editorial columns in the Spanish press reflects the
increased freedoms of speech and expression that were beginning to sweep the nation
touring Spain's transition from dictatorship to democracy. Publishing a variety of political
opinions adds to the trustworthiness of a publication because it better reflects the
Multifaceted opinions and beliefs ofthe public.
Another important change that improved the press’ obligation to the truth was an
increased use of direct quotes, numbers and statistics. Rather than running political
^unouncements and notices actually drafted by the Spanish government or Franco
himself, as seen in previous case studies, the 1960 and 1970 case studies show an overall
increased use of short quotations, providing clips of statements made by public officials
without running an entire government-controlled press release ofinformation. A greater
use of numbers and statistics was seen in the case study comparisons as well, as
illustrated by the content of the 1960 ABC story ""Las deudas del estadoC Rather than
having the information pre-analyzed, censored and checked by the government,the use of
raw, hard facts such as direct quotes and statistics allowed for individuals to make
analytical and interpretive decisions for themselves—^thereby creating a stronger, more
trustworthy bond between the reader and the actual news or information. Again, as Zhong
and Newhagen described, the decision to include more direct quotes and statistics
represents the changing cultural values of the Spanish state. An increased use of hard
facts reflects a more trustworthy and freer press, reflecting the improvement ofthe
Spanish press in terms of these two fundamental journalistic elements.
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Limitations of the press’ improvement: Confusion in the midst of new liberties
Although the transition from dictatorship to democracy certainly brought a
liberalization of the Spanish press and an improvement in the fundamental standards of
journalism, the improvement was not black and white and challenges were met along the
way. With the hazy wording of the 1966 Press and Print Law, the hesitation of the
government to allow for total freedom of the press, and the questioning of whether or not
democracy would actually come to Spain following Franco’s death, backward steps were
taken throughout the transition. An example of this lies in the history of ABC.
On the morning of July 21, 1966, the daily edition of ABC Madrid was taken from
the shelves and confiscated in full by the Spanish government. The cause of the
confiscation was an editorial entitled “Everybody's Monarchy,” a column that carried the
opinion that Don Juan, son of King Alfonso Vlll, should be made king of Spain
following Franco’s future death rather than Juan Carlos, the grandson of Alfonso VIII,
who Franco had been mentoring since the age of 10 (Schulte 244). Occurring three
months and 12 days following the signing of the 1966 Press and Print Law,the
confiscation of this national periodical’s morning edition reflects an obvious limitation to
the freedoms provided by the new, liberalized press law.
The government defended its confiscation of the periodical by citing Article 64 of
the 1966 Press and Print Law which “gives the government the right to confiscate
‘printed matter or a publication . . . wherever they may be found as well as the matrices in
order to prevent their distribution' wlicn government officials ‘have knowledge of an act
which may constitute a crime committed by the press or printing business (Scbuhe
244). The crime ABC was accused of with the July 21, 1966 issue was never revealed by
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the government. This act of the Franco regime is an example ofthe limitations that were
sewn into the patchwork of the new press law and of the vaguely worded threats
sprinkled throughout the law’s many articles.
ABC, however, did not accept the confiscation of its issue without explanation and
ended up taking the matter to court. The case was heard in two separate court hearings,
and in the end, it was ruled that the government was to void the confiscation (Schulte
245). Although this was an eventual victory for the publication and for the Spanish press
as a whole, the confiscation of this issue ofABC reflects the limitations and limbo in
which the Spanish press danced between the passing of the 1966 Press and Print Law and
the official transition of Spain from dictatorship to democracy.
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Figure 3-1

May 5,1960

■ Feature/Culture
■ International News
■ Sports
■ Business/Economy
■ National Politics
■ Enterprise

Figure 3-2

i

■ Feature/Culture
■ Sports
■ International News
■ National Politics
■ Business/Economy
■ Enterprise
■ Breaking News
■ Opinion
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CHAPTER IV: The Spanish Press in the Early Years of Democratic Spain (1977—1989):

Political, Social and Economic Background
Overwhelmingly ratified by the Spanish public on December 15, 1976, the
Political Reform Act of 1976 called for the democratic election ofthe Cortes, or
legislative branch of the Spanish government. This bill was the first step ofthe legal
transformation of the Spanish state to democracy—reflecting the success ofPrime
Minister Adolfo Suarez and King Juan Carlos in converting Francisco Franco’s
hodgepodge of authoritarian regulations into a platform on which a successful democracy
could be built. The next step in the legal transformation came exactly half a year later. On
June 15, 1977, the first democratic elections ofthe new government were held, with
Suarez’s own National Movement winning by a large majority over the Communist
Party, the only other option on the ballot(Ross 8, 9). After years of being subjected to
one party, one person, one voice and no choice, the Spanish people were given the
freedom to vote in a national election and to express their individual political opinions
without fear of castigation.
Since 1941, Freedom House, an independent watchdog organization in
Washington D.C., has supported, monitored and ranked nations ofthe world according to
degrees of freeness. Following Francisco Franco’s death in 1975, the organization shifted
Spain’s classification from “Not Free” to “Partly Free”(Encamacion 37). A
straightforward, two-word distinction, this label spelled out with simplicity the nation’s
transfer from Franco’s obviously “Not Free” authoritative rule to the “Partly Free” limbo
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in which King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez were left to maneuver. Two years
later, following the first successful democratic elections in 1977, Freedom House shifted
the nation's ranking from “Partly Free" to 'Tree

-an official, internationally recognized

distinction that has since remained constant for over 30 years(Encamacion 37).
While the elections of 1977 clearly signified the nation’s transition to democracy.
the infant democratic state faced a number of challenges throughout its first five years,
including a deteriorating economy, an initial lack of streamlined enthusiasm for the new
democracy, and an unsuccessful attempt by a small military group to usurp the Spanish
government. After decades of international isolation and self-sufficiency, the economic
boom of the 1960s and early 1970s led to a strong dependency on foreign nations and
markets abroad—especially in terms of oil imports. With limited natural resources of its
own, Spain’s industrial sector relied heavily on cheap oil imports from the Middle East, a
dependency which proved to be dangerous when the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Counties(OPEC)raised oil prices drastically in 1973. This substantial rise in
oil prices severely damaged the entire Spanish economy over a period of many years,
resulting in severe inflation and an increase in unemployment rates(Ross 136). With
devastating changes plaguing the economy, the legal transition from dictatorship to
democracy came at an uneasy, unsure time for much ofthe Spanish citizeniy.
Another challenge to the young democracy was Prime Minister Su^ez’s and King
Juan Carlos’ need to please a number of different political opinions, with extreme
expectations for the new democracy being vocalized from many different sides. As a
member of the right-wing National Movement, Su^ez had to juggle both reluctance from
his own party and extreme demands from the left. King Juan Carlos faced these pressures
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as well. Two years before the 1977 elections, members ofthe left-wing opposition voiced
their opinions and demands for change with gusto in the international press. In a Time
article published November 3, 1975, a Communist Party official stated that, “If Juan
Carlos does not offer change and change quickly, he will be consigning himselfto
oblivion"(“Spain: After Franco: Hope and Fear’*). Another quote featured in the article
was even harsher. Santiago Carrillo, secretary-general ofthe Communist Party during the
time, stated that "a wave ofterror that will lead to a new civil war" would ensue if drastic
change was not made by the new Spanish leaders”(“Spain: After Franco: Hope and
Fear”).
Threats like these, however, faded throughout the following months, Juan Carlos
and Suarez displayed their intentions for a democratic Spanish state with the Political
Reform Act of 1976 and the ensuing democratic elections. The need to please different
ideologies while drafting the constitution, however, persisted—^resulting in a search for a
political consensus from all sides(Encamacion 39). The leftward opposition, which had
previously hoped to break completely from the past, ultimately agreed to work within the
restrictions ofthe Franco regulation, resulting in the description ofthe new government
as “a negotiated break from the past”(Ross 9).
One ofthe last and least subtle challenges to the young democracy was an
attempted military coup against the newly elected government. Having been a principal
element ofthe Franco regime’s power, some in the military had shown reluctance
towards the nation’s transition to democracy from the start of the process, and on
February 23, 1981, a small, extremist group of Spanish civil guards resorted to drastic
and unsuccessful measures. Led by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero Molina, a small
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group invaded an active session of the Cortes, holding the members in confinement for
36 hours. The coup was unsuccessful, however, due to the loyalty of the majority ofthe
Spanish military and the nation’s law enforcement sector to the new democracy.
Ultimately, instead of taking down the new democracy, the coup strengthened it—
bringing together political leaders from various factions, unified in support ofthe new
democratic Spanish state (Ross 9).
Overcoming these challenges, the Cortes passed the Democratic Constitution of
1978—a constitution that remains intact today. In it, there is a concentration on three
main points: “basic rights and liberties, the role of Parliament, and provisions for regional
self-government”(Ross 17). The category “basic rights and liberties” included
regulations allowing for the unrestricted formation of other political parties, including the
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol(PSOE), or the Spanish Socialist Party. A clear
change from Franco’s abhorrence of political parties, the surfacing and consolidation of
these new political ideologies was seen as a sign of hope for the young democracy
(Encamacion 37). This freedom to express various beliefs was not only intended for
politicians and political figures—it also called for freedom of expression for individuals
and groups, including news organizations as well.
With the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of 1978, the failure
of the military coup in 1981, and the subsequent support from varied political leaders, the
success of the infant democracy seemed tangible by the start of the new decade. The new
government clearly proved to be living up to Freedom Housers distinction as a “Free”
state. And on October 28, 1982, the success of Spain’s transition to democracy was
sealed with the third general election of the new Spanish state. Defeating Su^ez’s
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National Movement and the other political parties in the running, the Spanish Socialist
Party won by a landslide, marking, for the first time in Spain’s extensive history, the
successful transition from one democratically elected party to another(Ross 7-10). The
transition from dictatorship to democracy was officially complete.
Following the completion ofthe transition years, a number of social factors
throughout the 1980s indicated the lasting success ofthe new Spanish democracy. Within
the decade, Spain was accepted into both the United Nations and NATO—acceptances
which reflected the nation’s dramatic change from the diplomatically and economically
isolated Spain of the 1930s and 1940s to the internationally linked Spain ofthe 1950s and
beyond. Although its acceptance by these communities was largely facilitated by the
nation’s geographic vicinity to the other stronghold Western European democracies, such
as France and England, the rapidity in which it was incorporated into these intrinsically
democratic institutions reflects the true success ofthe transition (Encamacion 37-38).
Through its subsequent diplomatic, political and economic affiliations with these and
other democratic states, the consolidation of the new democratic state was strengthened
even more.
In 1939 Spain was under the tyrant rule of Caudillo Francisco Franco. Individual
liberties were denied, the press was silenced and one man ruled. Half a century later, in
1989, Spain was, as it is today, a parliamentary monarchy. With a democratically elected
parliament of 300 to 400 representatives, the legislative body has the law-making power.
Individual liberties have been granted to the public and the press and the people have the
ability to voice multiple opinions. The 1978 Constitution put the law-making power in
the hands of the electorally chosen parliament rather than the monarch—thereby ensuring
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the democracy of the Spanish state: ‘‘Both the monarch and his heir—on coming of agemust swear an oath of loyalty. Its wording expresses the Crown’s subordination to the
law of the land and, above all, to the Spanish people as a whole”(Ross 22).

The Spanish Press: The Transition and Beyond
From 1966 to 1975, ambiguity and uncertainly plagued the Spanish press. With
the combination of the progressive yet limited 1966 Press and Print Law as well as
Franco’s ever-present but loosened authoritative rule, the Spanish press spent a decade
dancing between vaguely drawn lines—hesitantly flexing the muscles provided by the
new press law but still keeping in mind the dictator’s watchful eye and possible
punishments. However, with Franco’s death in 1975 and the subsequent transfer of
power from authoritarian rule to a democratically elected representative government, the
fear that had threatened individuals and reporters alike was theoretically lifted. The
floodgates were raised, allowing for the realization of a free press.

Is the Press ’ First Obligation to the Truth?
As Kovach and Rosenstiel point out,“The notion of fi-eedom ofthe press is rooted
in independence. Only a press free of government censors [can] tell the truth”(30). With
the arrival of democracy and the newfound freedom ofjournalism in Spain,for the first
time in decades, periodical publications had the opportunity to deliver the truth to the
Spanish public. Although professional journalists had for decades been pledging an oath
to journalistic truth—to never “[permit] false-hood, craft, or ambition to distort [their]
pen in its daily labor,” as discussed in Chapter Two,there was a clear lack oftruthfulness
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in the Spanish press under the restrictions of the Press Law of 1938. So, supported by the
guaranteed freedoms of speech and expression, did the Spanish press turn to truth as its
first obligation?
In order to answer this, a second influence on the truthfulness of a nation’s press
must be considered. Kovach and Rosenstiel maintain that “In a modem context, that
freedom was expanded to mean independence from other institutions as well—^parties.
advertisers, business, and more”(30). In addition to independence from government
restrictions, the Committee of Concerned Journalists that Kovach and Rosenstiel have
written the findings of has specified that to be considered a tmthful free press it must be
free of all institutional, political or commercial ties as well. In one sense of this
definition, there was major improvement of this journalistic ideal throughout the first
decade of the Spanish democracy. In another, however, a paradoxical switch was made.
During the Franco years, the majority of periodical publications were owned by
either the government itself or institutions with governmental connections. For example,
the major national daily Ya and many other publications were under direct ownership of
the Catholic Church (Ross 125). With the media financially dependent on bulwarks ofthe
Franco regime, this ownership of the press served as yet another way in which Franco
held control over the content and “tmthfulness” of the nation’s periodical press.
However,following the 1977 installment of the first democratically elected Cortes, a
significant drop in the number of govemmentally owned publications began—a drop that
continued throughout the turn of the decade. “By 1984 the last ofthe state’s own chain of
newspapers had been sold off’(Ross 125). In this regard, the independence and freedom
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of the Spanish press improved—adding to the credibility and truthfulness ofthe media
content.
While there was a decrease in government ownership of publications, there was a
simultaneous increase in partisanship ofthe Spanish press—a trend that goes against the
need for ‘‘independence from other institutions'’ including political parties(Kovach and
Rosenstiel 30). The press under Franco was able to support and publish one point of
view and one point of view only. It had to be pro-caudillo, pro-Church, pro-nationalist
and anti-liberal—no exceptions without the risk ofserious repercussions. After the
transition to democracy, however, voices from all sides ofthe political spectrum

were

allowed to offer their opinions. The publication El Pais,founded in 1976, is a
traditionally liberal daily, whereas ABC has been regarded as a historically conservative
paper (Media). In contrast to the one-voiced press ofthe Franco years, the slightly
partisan press of the new democracy provided a variety of voices-

more truthful and

accurate representation of the Spanish society that had been silenced for so long. In this
sense, yes, the periodical press indeed succeeded in terms oftruthfulness, despite the
presence of slight political leanings in the opinion and editorial sections ofthe
publications.

Does the press provide citizens with information necessaiyfor them to live their day-today lives?
As displayed by the case studies discussed in Chapter Three, there were a few
significant changes between the ABC issues from the first decades of the Franco
dictatorship and those from the 1960s and 1970s. There was an increase in the length of
the actual publications, an expansion oftopics covered, and a new presence of editorial or
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opinion columns. These notable changes remained and developed even more in the
second half of the 1970s and the 1980s.
In terms of length, the individual issues continued to get longer and longer
throughout the years. The May 5, 1970 issue ofABC consisted of 120 pages. Five years
later, on May 6, 1975, the paper contained 160 pages—an increase of33.3 percent.
Throughout the following decade, the length continued to grow. In the December 5,1982
issue, the page count was up to 192 pages, and on December 31,1989,there were a total
of 162 pages(ABC.es Hemeroteca). The December 5,1982 issue was a Sunday edition,
calling for a longer classified ad and advertisements section, in addition to a longer-thanusual feature section. However, stretching to 192 pages for one individual Sunday
edition, this issue reflects the publication’s enormous expansion since the days ofthe 14page-long edition run on June 1, 1948—^the 1982 edition being over thirteen times as
long as the 1948 paper.
As discussed in the Introduction,journalism is the act of delivering newsworthy
information to the public—to engage the public with the happenings around them and

to

create a better informed citizenry. The need for a well-informed citizenry grew far more
important with the nation’s transition from dictatorship to democracy. With power in the
hands of the people, democracy calls for responsible, informed decisions made by the
public. In contrast to the encouraged disillusionment and detachment ofthe citizenry
from governmental affairs under Franco’s dictatorship, an informed public was
considered necessary within the new Spanish democracy.
Investigative or watchdog journalism is often regarded as a staple of democratic
freedom. A form ofjournalism in which publications reveal detailed information on
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groups, people or institutions in power, this watchdog role of the press provides for the
aceoumahility and transparency of those with authority. Each nation's press has a unique
history with investigative journalism: however,from culture to culture, the definition and
role of investigative journalism more or less stays constant. The importance and need for
this form of reporting is well-described in a 2008 Neiman Reports article tvritten by Rex
Smith.
“Most of us went into journalism to make a difference. And our role

as an

independent public watchdog—recognized as an essential balancing force to hold
powerful interests accountable—has its roots in the founding documents of our
democracy. Our hope today is that by continuing to focus resources and attention
on investigative reporting we will reveal a true picture of experiences that affect
people's lives. Watchdog reporting is vital to what newspapers offer readers...
our readers assure us they need us to keep doing it, so when we do we send an
important signal that even in tough times we recognize the value ofjournalism
that matters.”(Smith 16)
In his lecture entitled “Secrets of the Past, Accountability in the Present: the
Challenge for Journalism in Latin America,” John Dinges discussed trends regarding the
periodical press of Latin American nations throughout their own transitions from
dictatorship to democracy. Dinges said that in many cases, there was an explosion of
investigative reporting throughout these nations’ transitions. According to Dinges, Chile
had “its most robust period ofjournalism during the transition” in the 1980s and that
many other Latin American nations experienced the same trend. He added, however, that
following the periods of change and once democracy is reached, this increase in
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investigative journalism typically levels off, and “watchdog journalism wanes, withers'

(Dinges).
A similar yet limited trend occurred within Spanish journalism during the nation’s
transition from dictatorship to democracy. With the loosening of controls over the
Spanish press, an increase in investigative reporting did indeed occur. In the May 6,1975
edition of ABC, half a year before Franco’s death, an investigative piece ran that
documented the year's record of labor strikes throughout the nation. The story, which ran
on pages 39 and 40 of that day’s edition, provided statistics and details regarding the 365
strikes that had already occurred within the first quarter ofthe year(ABC.es
Hemeroteca). The strikes reflected the dissatisfaction of a portion ofthe working class,
and reporting on them revealed and recorded this unhappiness. On December 5,1982, an
investigative article in ABC reported on the devaluation ofthe peseta, the nation’s
currency, and explored reasons behind the nation’s economic trouble(ABC.es
Hemeroteca).
Although there was an increase in articles such as these in the pages of ABC and
other periodicals, the focus of Spanish reporting stayed fixed on features, sports and
international news, reflecting the limitations on this increased focus on investigative
reporting. ABC's distribution of editorial space in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the same
trend seen in the 1960s and early 1970s. Still dominated by features, lifestyle articles and
sports stories, 52.4 percent ofthe editorial content ofthe May 6,1975 issue was devoted
to these sections—26.2 percent to feature and lifestyle articles and an equal 26.2 percent
to sports. In order by percentages, the remainder ofthe content was spread throughout the
following sections: 16.5 percent to national news and politics, 14.5 to international news.
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11.6 to business, three to opinion and two to local news. These percentages stayed almost
constant over the following decade, reflecting little change in this aspect of the Spanish
press (ABC.es Hemeroteca).
While there was little \'ariation in tenns of the breakdo\^'n of editorial content in
the transition to democracy and the first decade of the new democratic state, the Spanish
press took on a new. fundamentally important attitude and role in society during these
years. Alter decades of authoritarian rule, democracy was an entirely new concept to the
Spanish people, who were uninformed of and unaccustomed to the political jargon
associated with democracy—of elections, political parties and other key aspects of a
democratic state. During the transition and throughout the first decade of democracy, the
periodical press served as a translator between the politicians and the people, making
sense of the new tenninologies and concepts that the Spanish public was being
introduced to. There was a consensus within the Spanish press to unite in order to help
achieve and facilitate the emergence of democracy-

unification which helped bring out

the successful transition from dictatorship to democracy (Montero 6). The role ofthe
Spanish periodical press during these years reflects the organic, mutually beneficial
relationship that was formed between the free press and the new democracy.
In the May 6, 1975 issue of ABC,two artieles were included that dealt with the
nation’s political transition. The first of the two ran on page 43 and referenced multiple
conferences that had been held throughout the year planning for the transition following
the death of Franco.

article expressed doubt and questions over the future of the

Spanish government, representing the fact tllhl Franco’s plan of continued authoritative
rule certainly was not set in stone. The second article,
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ccntro-dereclu) da?rocra1ico

coma opcion politico"("A Right-centered Democracy as a Political Option '). siso
contained facts regarding the potential transition (ABC.es Hemeroteca). ABC, a
historically rightward-leaning publication, published these articles during the transition of
the Spanish government to democracy—representing the unified aim of the Spanish press
as a whole in spreading awareness of and bringing about the new government. Through
taking on this role, the Spanish press did indeed provide the public with necessary and
newsworthy infomiation needed throughout these years, a role which directly affected the
successful emergence of the Spanish state.
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CHAPTER V: Final Conclusions

Between 1939 and 1989. the pendulum of the Spanish press swung from the
center of its trajectory to the right, then from the right of its path to the left. Within half a
century, the Spanish press went from being under complete censorship by Franco’s
authoritative regime to having full freedoms of speech and expression under the new
democratic Spanish state. The oscillations seen throughout the twentieth century are part
of the more than 500-year tradition of the pendulum of the Spanish press, and they reflect
the major cultural, social and journalistic changes that occurred over this 50-year time
period in the history of the Spanish nation.
The successes and failures of the Spanish press varied greatly throughout these
years. Subjugated to the Press Law of 1938, the Spanish periodical press from 1939
through the 1950s was used as a public relations vehicle by the regime of Francisco
Franco. The press was used to spread pro-nationalist and pro-caudillo messages to the
Spanish public. Lighthearted feature stories, sports statistics, international events and
cheery advertisements filled the pages of the nation’s periodical publications, showing a
false sense of contentment under the Franco dictatorship. Unable to run necessary,
truthful and relevant accounts of

national government, the restrictions ot

the 1938 law produced a press that failed both in substantlalill|l ItS l"ftr<'4'2®3ental
journalistic obligation to the truth and in providing the Spanish citizens with the
necessary hard news needed to make informed judgments about the nation in which they
lived.

71

L

In the 1960s and early 1970s, alongside the liberalization of Spanish social norms,
international relations and the national economy, a liberalization ofthe Spanish press
occurred. This greater-liberalized press brought with it increased success in terms of
these two fundamental aspects ofjournalism. With more room for editorial content in the
longer individual issues, the Spanish press was able to fit more stories covering a wider
variety of topics within the pages of its periodicals. The most notable additions were the
arrival of opinion columns and an increased emphasis on economic stories, changes that
reflected the shifting cultural norms of Spanish society during these decades oftransition.
The Spanish press improved in terms oftruthfulness as well. With its greater use of
quotations and statistics, the press put substantial distance between itself and the
authoritanan government, thereby strengthening the relationship between the press and
the public.
Within the scope of this study, the most important role ofthe Spanish press
appeared during the nation’s legal transition from dictatorship to democracy and
throughout the first year of the new democratic state. With even greater success in terms
of the two basic fundamental elements ofjournalism behind it, the Spanish press served
as a key component in the nation’s successful transition to democracy. The press
succeeded in providing the public with the day-to-day information needed to become an
informed, involved citizenry

a vital element to a successful and healthy democracy.

As seen in Chapter Three, despite the liberalization ofthe authoritative regime in
the 1960s and the passing of the 1966 Press and Print Law,the press under Franco was
never free. The freedom

of the Spanish press could not have been reached without the

nation s successful transition to democracy. At the same time, the Spanish press filled a
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vital niche during the nation's transformation to a democratic stat(

-providing the people

with the vocabulary, information and news necessary to be an informed public. The free
Spanish press and the democratic Spanish state formed a mutually beneficial relationship
between 1975 and the first decade ofthe new democracy—one in which each depended
on the other for support and for success. The histories ofthe two have been interwoven,
and the present and future state of each will forever be influenced and determined by the
other.
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